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Abstract
Second-price auctions with reserve play a critical role in the revenue of modern search engine and popular
online sites since the revenue of these companies often directly depends on the outcome of such auctions. The
choice of the reserve price is the main mechanism through which the auction revenue can be influenced in
these electronic markets. We cast the problem of selecting the reserve price to optimize revenue as a learn-
ing problem and present a full theoretical analysis dealing with the complex properties of the corresponding
loss function. We further give novel algorithms for solving this problem and report the results of several
experiments in both synthetic and real data demonstrating their effectiveness.
1. Introduction
Over the past few years, advertisement has gradually moved away from the traditional printed promotion to
the more tailored and directed online publicity. The advantages of online advertisement are clear: since most
modern search engine and popular online site companies such as as Microsoft, Facebook, Google, eBay, or
Amazon, may collect information about the users’ behavior, advertisers can better target the population sector
their brand is intended for.
More recently, a new method for selling advertisements has gained momentum. Unlike the standard
contracts between publishers and advertisers where some amount of impressions is required to be fulfilled
by the publisher, an Ad Exchange works in a way similar to a financial exchange where advertisers bid and
compete between each other for an ad slot. The winner then pays the publisher and his ad is displayed.
The design of such auctions and their properties are crucial since they generate a large fraction of the
revenue of popular online sites. These questions have motivated extensive research on the topic of auctioning
in the last decade or so, particularly in the theoretical computer science and economic theory communities.
Much of this work has focused on the analysis of mechanism design, either to prove some useful property
of an existing auctioning mechanism, to analyze its computational efficiency, or to search for an optimal
revenue maximization truthful mechanism (see (Muthukrishnan, 2009) for a good discussion of key research
problems related to Ad Exchange and references to a fast growing literature therein).
One important problem is that of determining an auction mechanism that achieves optimal revenue
Muthukrishnan (2009). In the ideal scenario where the valuation of the bidders is drawn i.i.d. from a given
distribution, this is known to be achievable (see for example (Myerson, 1981)). But, even good approxima-
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tions of such distributions are not known in practice. Game theoretical approaches to the design of auctions
have given a series of interesting results including (Riley and Samuelson, 1981; Milgrom and Weber, 1982;
Myerson, 1981; Nisan et al., 2007), all of them based on some assumptions about the distribution of the
bidders, e.g., the monotone hazard rate assumption.
The results of the recent publications have nevertheless set the basis for most Ad Exchanges in practice:
the mechanism widely adopted for selling ad slots is that of a Vickrey auction (Vickrey, 1961) or second-price
auction with reserve price r (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010). In such auctions, the winning bidder (if any) pays
the maximum of the second-place bid and the reserve price r. The reserve price can be set by the publisher
or automatically by the exchange. The popularity of these auctions relies on the fact that they are incentive
compatible, i.e., bidders bid exactly what they are willing to pay. It is clear that the revenue of the publisher
depends greatly on how the reserve price is set: if set too low, the winner of the auction might end up paying
only a small amount, even if his bid was really high; on the other hand, if it is set too high, then bidders may
not bid higher than the reserve price and the ad slot will not be sold.
We propose a machine learning approach to the problem of determining the reserve price to optimize
revenue in such auctions. The general idea is to leverage the information gained from past auctions to predict
a beneficial reserve price. Since every transaction on an Exchange is logged, it is natural to seek to exploit
that data. This could be used to estimate the probability distribution of the bidders, which can then be
used indirectly to come up with the optimal reserve price (Myerson, 1981; Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2011).
Instead, we will seek a discriminative method making use of the loss function related to the problem and
taking advantage of existing user features.
Machine learning methods have already been used for the related problems of designing incentive com-
patible auction mechanisms Balcan et al. (2008); Blum et al. (2004), for algorithmic bidding Langford et al.
(2010); Amin et al. (2012), and even for predicting bid landscapes Cui et al. (2011). Another closely related
problem for which machine learning solutions have been proposed is that of revenue optimization for spon-
sored search ads and click through rate predictions Zhu et al. (2009); He et al. (2013); Devanur and Kakade
(2009). But, to our knowledge, no prior work has used historical data in combination with user features for
the sole purpose of revenue optimization in this context. In fact, the only publications we are aware of that are
directly related to our objective are (Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2011) and the interesting work of Cesa-Bianchi
et al. (2013) which considers a more general case than (Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2011). The scenario studied
by Cesa-Bianchi et al. is that of censored information, which motivates their use of a regret minimization
algorithm to optimize the revenue of the seller. Our analysis assumes instead access to full information. We
argue that this is a more realistic scenario since most companies do in fact have access to the full historical
data.
The learning scenario we consider is more general since it includes the use of features, as is standard in
supervised learning. Since user information is sent to advertisers and bids are made based on this information,
it is only natural to include user features in our learning solution. A special case of our analysis coincides with
the no-feature scenario considered by Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2013), assuming full information. But, our results
further extend those of this paper even in that scenario. In particular, we present an O(m logm) algorithm
for solving a key optimization problem used as a subroutine by the authors, for which they do not seem to
give an algorithm. We also do not require an i.i.d. assumption about the bidders, although this is needed in
(Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2013) in order to deal with censored information only.
The theoretical and algorithmic analysis of this learning problem raises several non-trivial technical is-
sues. This is because, unlike some common problems in machine learning, here, the use of a convex surrogate
loss cannot be successful. Instead, we must derive an alternative non-convex surrogate requiring novel theo-
retical guarantees (Section 3) and a new algorithmic solution (Section 4). We present a detailed analysis of
possible surrogate losses and select a continuous loss that we prove to be calibrated and for which we give
generalization bounds. This leads to an optimization problem cast as a DC-programming problem whose
solutions are examined in detail: we first present an efficient combinatorial algorithm for solving that opti-
mization in the no-feature case, next we combine that solution with the DC algorithm (DCA) Tao and An
(1998) to solve the general case. Section 5 reports the results of our experiments with synthetic data in both
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the no-feature case and the general case as well as on data collected from eBay. We first introduce the problem
of selecting the reserve price to optimize revenue and cast it as a learning problem (Section 2).
2. Reserve price selection problem
As already discussed, the choice of the reserve price r is the main mechanism through which a seller can
influence the auction revenue. To specify the results of a second-price auction we need only the vector of first
and second highest bids which we denote by b = (b(1), b(2)) ∈ B ⊂ R2+. For a given reserve price r and bid
pair b, the revenue of an auction is given by
Revenue(r,b) = b(2)1r<b(2) + r1b(2)≤r≤b(1) . (1)
The simplest setup is one where there are no features associated with the auction. In that case, the objective
is to select r to optimize the expected revenue, which can be expressed as follows:
E
b
[Revenue(r,b)] = E
b(2)
[b(2)1r<b(2) ] + r P[b(2) ≤ r ≤ b(1)]
=
∫ +∞
0
P[b(2)1r<b(2) > t] dt+ r P[b(2) ≤ r ≤ b(1)]
=
∫ r
0
P[r < b(2)] dt+
∫ ∞
r
P[b(2) > t]dt+ r P[b(2) ≤ r ≤ b(1)]
=
∫ ∞
r
P[b(2) > t] dt+ r(P[b(2) > r] + 1− P[b(2) > r]− P[b(1) < r])
=
∫ ∞
r
P[b(2) > t] dt+ r P[b(1) ≥ r].
A similar derivation is given by Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2013). In fact, this expression is precisely the one
optimized by these authors. If we now associate with each auction a feature vector x ∈ X , the so-called
public information, and set the reserve price to h(x), where h : X → R+ is our reserve price hypothesis
function, the problem can be formulated as that of selecting out of some hypothesis setH a hypothesis h with
large expected revenue:
E
(x,b)∼D
[Revenue(h(x),b)], (2)
where D is the unknown distribution according to which the pairs (x,b) are drawn. Instead of the revenue,
we will consider a loss function L defined for all (r,b) by L(r,b) = −Revenue(r,b), and will seek a
hypothesis h with small expected loss L(h) := E(x,b)∼D[L(h(x),b)]. As in standard supervised learning
scenarios, we assume access to a training sample S = ((x1,b1), . . . , (xm,bm)) of size m ≥ 1 drawn i.i.d.
according toD and denote by L̂S(h) the empirical loss 1m
∑m
i=1 L(h(xi,bi). In the next sections, we present
a detailed study of this learning problem.
3. Learning guarantees
To derive generalization bounds for the learning problem formulated in the previous section, we need to
analyze the complexity of the family of functions LH mapping X × B to R defined by LH = {(x,b) 7→
L(h(x),b) : h ∈ H}. The loss function L is neither Lipschitz continuous nor convex (see Figure 1). To
analyze its complexity, we decompose L as a sum of two loss functions l1 and l2 with more convenient
properties. We have L = l1 + l2 with l1 and l2 defined for all (r,b) ∈ R× B by
l1(r,b) = −b(2)1r<b(2) − r1b(2)≤r≤b(1) − b(1)1r>b(1)
l2(r,b) = b
(1)1r>b(1) .
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Figure 1: (a) Plot of the loss function r 7→ L(r,b) for fixed values of b(1) and b(2); (b) piecewise linear
convex surrogate loss.
Note that for a fixed b, the function r 7→ l1(r,b) is 1-Lipschitz since the slope of the lines defining the
function is at most 1. We will consider the corresponding family of loss functions: l1H = {(x,b) 7→
l1(h(x),b) : h ∈ H} and l2H = {(x,b) 7→ l2(h(x),b) : h ∈ H} and use the notions of pseudo-dimension
as well as empirical and average Rademacher complexity. The pseudo-dimension is a standard complexity
measure (Pollard, 1984) extending the notion of VC-dimension to real-valued functions (see also (Mohri
et al., 2012)). For a family of functions G and finite sample S = (z1, . . . , zm) of size m, the empirical
Rademacher complexity is defined by R̂S(G) = Eσ
[
supg∈G
1
m
∑m
i=1 σig(zi)
]
, where σ = (σ1, . . . , σm)>,
with σis independent uniform random variables taking values in {−1,+1}. The Rademacher complexity of
G is defined as Rm(G) = ES∼Dm [R̂S(G)].
In order to bound the complexity of LH we will first bound the complexity of the family of loss functions
l1H and l2H .
Proposition 1 For any hypothesis set H and any sample S = ((x1,b1), . . . , (xm,bm)), the empirical
Rademacher complexity of l1H can be bounded as follows:
R̂S(l1H) ≤ R̂S(H).
Proof By definition of the empirical Rademacher complexity, we can write
R̂S(l1H) =
1
m
E
σ
[
sup
h∈H
m∑
i=1
σil1(h(xi),bi)
]
=
1
m
E
σ
[
sup
h∈H
m∑
i=1
σi(ψi ◦ h)(xi)
]
,
where, for all i ∈ [1,m], ψi is the function defined by ψi : r 7→ l1(r,bi). For any i ∈ [1,m], ψi is 1-Lipschitz,
thus, by the contraction lemma 18, we have the inequality R̂S(l1H) ≤ 1m Eσ[suph∈H
∑m
i=1 σih(xi)] =
R̂S(H).
Proposition 2 Let M = supb∈B b(1). Then, for any hypothesis set H with pseudo-dimension d = Pdim(H)
and any sample S = ((x1,b1), . . . , (xm,bm)), the empirical Rademacher complexity of l2H can be bounded
as follows:
R̂S(l2H) ≤
√
2d log emd
m
.
Proof By definition of the empirical Rademacher complexity, we can write
R̂S(l2H) =
1
m
E
σ
[
sup
h∈H
m∑
i=1
σib
(1)
i 1h(xi)>b
(1)
i
]
=
1
m
E
σ
[
sup
h∈H
m∑
i=1
σiΨi(1h(xi)>b(1)i
)
]
,
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Figure 2: Comparison of the sum of real losses
∑m
i=1 L(·,bi) for m = 500 versus two different surrogates.
(a) Sum of convex surrogate losses: the minimizer significantly differs from that of the sum of the
original losses. (b) The surrogate loss sum
∑m
i=1 Lγ(·,bi) for γ = .02
where for all i ∈ [1,m], Ψi is the M -Lipschitz function x 7→ b(1)i x. Thus, by Lemma 18 combined with
Massart’s lemma (see for example Mohri et al. (2012)), we can write
R̂S(l2H) ≤ M
m
E
σ
[
sup
h∈H
m∑
i=1
σi1h(xi)>b(1)i
]
≤M
√
2d′ log emd′
m
,
where d′ = VCdim({(x,b) 7→ 1h(x)−b(1)>0 : (x,b) ∈ X × B}). Since the second bid component b(2)
plays no role in this definition, d′ coincides with VCdim({(x, b(1)) 7→ 1h(x)−b(1)>0 : (x, b(1)) ∈ X × B1}),
where B1 is the projection of B ⊆ R2 onto its first component, and is upper-bounded by VCdim({(x, t) 7→
1h(x)−t>0 : (x, t) ∈ X × R}), that is, the pseudo-dimension of H .
Theorem 3 Let M = supb∈B b(1) and let H be a hypothesis set with pseudo-dimension d = Pdim(H).
Then, for any δ > 0, with probability at least 1 − δ over the choice of a sample S of size m, the following
inequality holds for all h ∈ H:
L(h) ≤ L̂S(h) + 2Rm(H) + 2M
√
2d log emd
m
+M
√
log 1δ
2m
.
Proof By a standard property of the Rademacher complexity, since L = l1 + l2, the following inequality
holds: Rm(LH) ≤ Rm(l1H)+Rm(l2H). Thus, in view of Propositions 1 and 2, the Rademacher complexity
of LH can be bounded via
Rm(LH) ≤ Rm(H) +M
√
2d log emd
m
.
The result then follows by the application of a standard Rademacher complexity bound (Koltchinskii and
Panchenko, 2002).
This learning bound invites us to consider an algorithm seeking h∈H to minimize the empirical loss L̂S(h),
while controlling the complexity (Rademacher complexity and pseudo-dimension) of the hypothesis set H .
However, as in the familiar case of binary classification, in general, minimizing this empirical loss is a
computationally hard problem. Thus, in the next section, we study the question of using a surrogate loss
instead of the original loss L.
3.1 Surrogate loss
As pointed out earlier, the loss function L does not admit some common useful properties: for any fixed b,
L(·,b) is not differentiable at two points, is not convex, and is not Lipschitz, in fact it is discontinuous. For
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any fixed b, L(·,b) is quasi-convex, a property that is often desirable since there exist several solutions for
quasi-convex optimization problems. However, in general, a sum of quasi-convex functions, such as the sum∑m
i=1 L(·,bi) appearing in the definition of the empirical loss, is not quasi-convex and a fortiori not convex.1
In fact, in general, such a sum may admit exponentially many local minima. This leads us to seek a surrogate
loss function with more favorable optimization properties.
A standard method in machine learning consists of replacing the loss function L with a convex upper
bound Bartlett et al. (2006). A natural candidate in our case is the piecewise linear convex function shown in
Figure 1(b). However, while this convex loss function is convenient for optimization, it is not calibrated and
does not provide a useful surrogate. The calibration problem is illustrated by Figure 2(a) in dimension one,
where the true objective function to be minimized
∑m
i=1 L(r,bi) is compared with the sum of the surrogate
losses. The next theorem shows that this problem affects in fact any non-constant convex surrogate. It is
expressed in terms of the loss L˜ : R×R+ → R defined by L˜(r, b) = −r1r≤b, which coincides with L when
the second bid is 0.
Definition 4 Let M > 0, we say a function L : [0,M ] × [0,M ] → R is consistent with L˜ if for every
distribution D there exists a minimizer r∗ ∈ argminr Eb∼D[Lc(r, b)] such that r∗ ∈ argminr Eb∼D[L˜(r, b)].
Definition 5 We say that a sequence of functions Ln : [0,M ] × [0,M ] is weakly consistent with L˜ if there
exists rn ∈ argminr Eb∼D[Ln(r, b)] such that rn → r∗ and r∗ ∈ argminEb∼D[L˜(r, b)].
Proposition 6 (convex surrogates) LetLc : [0,M ]×[0,M ]→ R be a bounded function, convex with respect
to its first argument. If Lc is consistent with L˜, then Lc(·, b) is constant for every b ∈ [0,M ].
Proof Let 0 < b1 < b2 < M , for every µ ∈ [0, 1] define Dµ to be the probability distribution supported on
{b1, b2} with Dµ(b1) = µ. Denote by Eµ the expectation with respect to this distribution. A straightforward
calculation shows that the unique minimizer of Eµ(L˜(r, b) is given by b1 if µ > b2−b1b2 and by b2 otherwise.
Therefore, if Fµ(r) = Eµ(Lc(r, b)), it must be the case that b1 is a minimizer of Fµ for µ < b2−b1b2 and b2
is a minimizer of Fµ for µ > b2−b1b2 . Let D
+
r and D
−
r denote the left and right derivatives with respect to r.
Since Fµ is a convex function, its right and left derivatives are well defined and we must have
0 ≥ D−r Fµ(b2) = µD−r Lc(b2, b1) + (1− µ)D−r Lc(b2, b2) for µ >
b2 − b1
b2
, (3)
0 ≤ D+r Fµ(b1) ≤ D−r Fµ(b2) for µ <
b2 − b1
b2
. (4)
Where the second inequality in (4) holds by convexity of Fµ and the fact that b2 > b1. By setting µ = b2−b1b2 ,
it follows from inequalities (3) and (4) that D−r Fµ(b2) = 0. Rearranging terms and replacing the value of µ
we arrive to the equivalent condition
(b2 − b1)D−r Lc(b2, b1) = −b1D−r Lc(b2, b2).
Since Lc is a bounded function it follows that D−r Lc(b2, b1) is bounded for every b1, b2 ∈ (0.M), therefore
as b1 → b2 we must have b2D−r Lc(b2, b2) = 0 which implies D−r Lc(b2, b2) = 0 for all b2 > 0. In view
of this, inequality (3) can only be satisfied if D−r Lc(b2, b1) ≤ 0. However, the convexity of Lc implies
D−r Lc(b2, b1) ≥ D−r (b1, b1) = 0. Therefore, D−r Lc(b2, b1) = 0 must hold for all b2 > b1 > 0. Similarly,
by definition of Fµ, the first inequality in (4) implies
µD+r Lc(b1, b1) +D
+
r Lc(b1, b2) ≥ 0. (5)
1. It is known that under some separability condition if a finite sum of quasi-convex functions on an open convex set is quasi-convex
then all but perhaps one of them is convex Debreu and Koopmans (1982).
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Nevertheless, for every b2 > b1 we have 0 = D−r Lc(b1, b1) ≤ D+r Lc(b1, b1) ≤ D−r Lc(b2, b1) = 0.
Consequently, D+r Lc(b1, b1) = 0 for all b1 > 0. Furthermore, D
+
r Lc(b1, b2) ≤ D+r Lc(b2, b2) = 0; thus, in
order for (5) to be satisfied we must have D+r Lc(b1, b2) = 0 for all b1 < b2.
Thus far, we have shown that for every b > 0, if r ≥ b, then D−r Lc(r, b) = 0, whereas D+r Lc(r, b) = 0
for r ≤ b. A simple convexity argument shows that Lc(·, b) is in fact differentiable and ddrLc(r, b) = 0 for
all r ∈ (0,M). Therefore it must be that Lc(·, b) is a constant function.
The result of the previous Proposition can be considerably strengthen as the following Theorem shows.
Theorem 7 Let M > 0 and let Ln : [0,M ] × [0,M ] → R be a sequence of functions convex and differen-
tiable with respect to its first coordinate satisfying
• supb∈[0,M ],n∈N max(| ddrLn(0, b)|, | ddrLn(M, b))| = K <∞
• Ln is weakly consistent with L˜.
• Ln(0, b) = 0 for all b.
If the sequence Ln converges pointwise to a function Lc then Ln(·, b) converges uniformly to Lc(·, b) ≡ 0.
Proof We first show that the functions Ln are uniformly bounded for every b.
|Ln(r, b)| =
∣∣∣ ∫ r
0
d
dr
Ln(r, b)dr
∣∣∣ ≤ ∫ M
0
max
(∣∣∣ d
dr
Ln(0, b)
∣∣∣, ∣∣∣ d
dr
Ln(M, b)
∣∣∣) dr
≤
∫ M
0
Kdr = MK.
Where the first inequality holds since, by convexity, the derivative of Ln with respect to r is an increasing
function. Let us show that the sequence Ln is also equicontinuous. It will follow then by the theorem of
Arzela-Ascoli that Ln(·, b) converges uniformly to Lc(·, b). Let r1, r2 ∈ [0,M ], for every b ∈ [0,M ] we
have
|Ln(r1, b)− Ln(r2, b)| ≤ sup
r∈[0,M ]
∣∣∣∣ ddrLn(r, b)
∣∣∣∣ |r1 − r2|
= max
(∣∣∣∣ ddrLn(0, b)
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣ ddrLn(M, b))
∣∣∣∣) |r1 − r2|
≤ K|r1 − r2|.
Where again we have used the convexity of Ln to derive the first equality. Let Fn(r) = Eb∼D[Ln(r, b)] and
F (r) = Eb∼D[Lc(r, b)]. It is immediate that Fn is a convex function and by invoking Arzela-Ascoli’s theo-
rem again we can show that the sequence Fn has a subsequence which is uniformly convergent. Furthermore
by the dominated convergence theorem we have Fn(r) converges pointwise to F (r). Therefore, the uniform
limit of Fn must be F . This implies that
min
r∈[0,M ]
F (r) = lim
n→∞ minr∈[0,M ]
Fn(r) = lim
n→∞Fn(rn) = F (r
∗),
which is precisely the definition of consistency with L˜. Furthermore, the function Lc(·, b) is convex since it
is the uniform limit of convex functions. It then follows by Theorem 6 it follows that Lc(·, b) ≡ Lc(0, b) = 0.
The above theorems show that even a weakly consistent sequence of convex losses is uniformly close to a
constant function and is therefore uninformative for our task. This leads us to consider alternative non-convex
7
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Figure 3: Comparison of the true loss L with (a) the surrogate loss L′γ ; (b) the surrogate loss Lγ , for γ = 0.1.
loss functions. Perhaps, the most natural surrogate loss is then L′γ , an upper bound on L defined for all γ > 0
by:
L′γ(r,b) = −b(2)1r≤b(2) − r1b(2)<r≤((1−γ)b(1))∨b(2)
+
(1− γ
γ
∨ b
(2)
b(1) − b(2)
)
(r − b(1))1(
(1−γ)b(1)
)
∨b(2)<r≤b(1) ,
where c ∨ d = max(c, d). The plot of this function is shown in Figure 3(a). The max terms ensure that the
function is well defined if (1−γ)b(1) < b(2). However, this turns out to be also a poor choice because L′γ is a
loose upper bound of L in the most critical region, that is around the minimum of the loss L. Thus, instead,
we will consider, for any γ > 0, the loss function Lγ defined as follows:
Lγ(r,b) = −b(2)1r≤b(2) − r1b(2)<r≤b(1) +
1
γ
(r − (1 + γ)b(1))1b(1)<r≤(1+γ)b(1) , (6)
and shown in Figure 3(b).2 A comparison between the sum of L-losses and the sum of Lγ-losses is shown in
Figure 2(b). Observe that the fit is considerably better than when using a piecewise linear convex surrogate
loss. A possible concern associated with the loss function Lγ is that it is a lower bound for L. One might
think then that minimizing it would not lead to an informative solution. However, we argue that this problem
arises significantly with upper bounding losses such as the convex surrogate, which we showed not to lead to a
useful minimizer, or L′γ , which is a poor approximation of L near its minimum. By matching the original loss
L in the region of interest, around the minimal value, the loss function Lγ leads to more informative solutions
in this problem. We further analyze the difference of expectations of L and Lγ and show that Lγ is calibrated.
Since Lγ → L as γ → 0, this result may seem trivial. However this convergence is not uniform and therefore
calibration is not guaranteed. We will use for any h ∈ H , the notation Lγ(h) := E(x,b)∼D[Lγ(h(x),b)].
Theorem 8 Let H be a closed, convex subset of a linear space of functions containing 0. Denote by h∗γ the
solution of minh∈H Lγ(h). If supb∈B b(1) = M <∞, then
L(h∗γ)− Lγ(h∗γ) ≤ γM.
The following sets, which will be used in our proof, form a partition of X × B
I1 = {(x,b)|h∗γ(x) ≤ b(2)} I2 = {(x,b)|h∗γ(x) ∈ (b(2), b(1)]}
I3 = {(x,b)|h∗γ(x) ∈ (b(1), (1 + γ)b(1)]} I4 = {(x,b)|h∗γ(x) > (1 + γ)b(1)}
This sets represent the different regions where Lγ is defined. In each region the function is affine. We will
now prove a technical lemma that will help us in the proof of Theorem 8.
2. Technically, the theoretical and algorithmic results we present for Lγ could be developed in a somewhat similar way for L′γ .
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Lemma 9 Under the conditions of Theorem 8,
E
x,b
[
h∗γ(x)1I2(x)
]
≥ 1
γ
E
x,b
[
h∗γ(x)1I3(x)
]
.
Proof Let 0 < λ < 1. Since H is a convex set, it follows that λh∗γ ∈ H; and from the definition of h∗γ we
must have:
E
x,b
[
Lγ(h
∗
γ(x),b)
]
≤ E
x,b
[
Lγ(λh
∗
γ(x),b)
]
. (7)
If h∗γ(x) < 0, then Lγ(h
∗
γ(x),b) = Lγ(λh
∗
γ(x)) = −b(2) by definition of Lγ . If on the other hand h∗γ(x) >
0, since λh∗γ(x) < h
∗
γ(x) we must have that for (x,b) ∈ I1 Lγ(h∗γ(x),b) = Lγ(λh∗γ(x),b) = −b(2) too.
Moreover, from the fact that Lγ ≤ 0 and Lγ(h∗γ(x),b) = 0 for (x,b) ∈ I4 it follows that Lγ(h∗γ(x),b) ≥
Lγ(λh
∗
γ(x),b) for (x,b) ∈ I4, and therefore the following inequality trivially holds:
E
x,b
[
Lγ(h
∗
γ(x),b)(1I1(x) + 1I4(x))
]
≥ E
x,b
[
Lγ(λh
∗
γ(x),b)(1I1(x) + 1I4(x))
]
. (8)
Subtracting (8) from (7) we obtain
E
x,b
[
Lγ(h
∗
γ(x),b)(1I2(x) + 1I3(x))
]
≤ E
x,b
[
Lγ(λh
∗
γ(x),b)(1I2(x) + 1I3(x))
]
.
By rearranging terms we can see this inequality is equivalent to
E
x,b
[
(Lγ(λh
∗
γ(x),b)− Lγ(h∗γ(x),b))1I2(x)
]
≥ E
x,b
[
(Lγ(h
∗
γ(x),b)− Lγ(λh∗γ(x),b))1I3(x)
]
(9)
Notice that if (x,b) ∈ I2, then Lγ(h∗γ(x),b) = −h∗γ(x). If λh∗γ(x) > b(2) too then Lγ(λh∗γ(x),b) =
−λh∗γ(x). On the other hand if λh∗γ(x) ≤ b(2) then Lγ(λh∗γ(x),b) = −b(2) ≤ −λh∗γ(x). Thus
E(Lγ(λh∗γ(x),b)− Lγ(h∗γ(x),b))1I2(x)) ≤ (1− λ)E(h∗γ(x)1I2(x)) (10)
This gives an upper bound for the left-hand side of inequality (9). We now seek to derive a lower bound on
the right-hand side. To do that, we analyze two different cases:
1. λh∗γ(x) ≤ b(1);
2. λh∗γ(x) > b
(1).
In the first case, we know that Lγ(h∗γ(x),b) =
1
γ (h
∗
γ(x) − (1 + γ)b(1)) > −b(1) (since h∗γ(x) > b(1) for
(x,b) ∈ I3). Furthermore, if λh∗γ(x) ≤ b(1), then, by definition Lγ(λh∗γ(x),b) = min(−b(2),−λh∗γ(x)) ≤
−λh∗γ(x). Thus, we must have:
Lγ(h
∗
γ(x),b)− Lγ(λh∗γ(x),b) > λh∗γ(x)− b(1) > (λ− 1)b(1) ≥ (λ− 1)M, (11)
where we used the fact that h∗γ(x) > b
(1) for the second inequality and the last inequality holds since
λ− 1 < 0.
We analyze the second case now. If λh∗γ(x) > b
(1), then for (x,b) ∈ I3 we have Lγ(h∗γ(x),b) −
Lγ(λh
∗
γ(x),b) =
1
γ (1 − λ)h∗γ(x). Thus, letting ∆(x,b) = Lγ(h∗γ(x),b) − Lγ(λh∗γ(x),b), we can lower
bound the right-hand side of (9) as:
E
x,b
[
∆(x,b)1I3(x)
]
= E
x,b
[
∆(x,b)1I3(x)1{λh∗γ(x)>b(1)}
]
+ E
x,b
[
∆(x,b)1I3(x)1{λh∗γ(x)≤b(1)}
]
≥ 1− λ
γ
E
x,b
[
h∗γ(x)1I3(x)1{λh∗γ(x)>b(1)}
]
+ (λ− 1)M P
[
h∗γ(x) > b
(1) ≥ λh∗γ(x)
]
,
(12)
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where we have used (11) to bound the second summand. Combining inequalities (9), (10) and (12) and
dividing by (1− λ) we obtain the bound
E
x,b
[
h∗γ(x)1I2(x)
]
≥ 1
γ
E
x,b
[
h∗γ(x)1I3(x)1{λh∗γ(x)>b(1)}
]
−M P
[
h∗γ(x) > b
(1) ≥ λh∗γ(x)
]
.
Finally, taking the limit λ→ 1, we obtain
E
x,b
[
h∗γ(x)1I2(x)
]
≥ 1
γ
E
x,b
[
h∗γ(x)1I3(x)
]
.
Taking the limit inside the expectation is justified by the bounded convergence theorem and P[h∗γ(x) > b(1) ≥
λh∗γ(x)]→ 0 holds by the continuity of probability measures.
Proof [Of Theorem 8]. We can express the difference as
E
x,b
[
L(h∗γ(x),b)− Lγ(h∗γ(x),b)
]
=
4∑
k=1
E
x,b
[
(L(h∗γ(x),b)− Lγ(h∗γ(x),b))1Ik(x)
]
= E
x,b
[
(L(h∗γ(x),b)− Lγ(h∗γ(x),b))1I3(x)
]
= E
x,b
[ 1
γ
((1 + γ)b(1) − h∗γ(x))1I3(x))
]
. (13)
Furthermore, for (x,b) ∈ I3, we know that b(1) < h∗γ(x). Thus, we can bound (13) by Ex,b[h∗γ(x)1I3(x)],
which, by Lemma 9, is less than γ Ex,b
[
h∗γ(x)1I2(x)
]
. We thus have:
E
x,b
[
L(h∗γ(x),b)
]
− E
x,b
[
Lγ(h
∗
γ(x),b)
]
≤ γ E
x,b
[
h∗γ(x)1I2(x)
]
≤ γ E
x,b
[
b(1)1I2(x)
]
≤ γM,
since h∗γ(x) ≤ b(1) for (x,b) ∈ I2.
Notice that, since L ≥ Lγ for all γ ≥ 0, it follows easily from the proposition that Lγ(h∗γ)→ L(h∗). Indeed,
if h∗ is the best hypothesis in class for the real loss, then the following inequalities are straightforward:
0 ≤ Lγ(h∗)− Lγ(h∗γ) ≤ L(h∗)− Lγ(h∗γ)
≤ L(h∗γ)− Lγ(h∗γ) ≤ γM
The 1/γ-Lipschitzness of Lγ can be used to prove the following generalization bound.
Theorem 10 Fix γ ∈ (0, 1] and let S denotes a sample of size m. Then, for any δ > 0, with probability at
least 1− δ over the choice of the sample S, for all h ∈ H , the following holds:
Lγ(h) ≤ L̂γ(h) + 2
γ
Rm(H) +M
√
log 1δ
2m
. (14)
Proof Let Lγ,H denote the family of functions {(x,b)→ Lγ(h(x), b) : h ∈ H}. The loss function Lγ is 1γ -
Lipschitz since the slope of the lines defining it is at most 1γ . Thus, using the contraction lemma (Lemma 18)
as in the proof of Proposition 1 gives Rm(Lγ,H) ≤ 1γRm(H). The application of a standard Rademacher
complexity bound to the family of functions Lγ,H then shows that for any δ > 0, with probability at least
1− δ, for any h ∈ H , the following holds:
Lγ(h) ≤ L̂γ(h) + 2
γ
Rm(H) +M
√
log 1δ
2m
.
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We conclude this section by presenting a stronger form of consistency result. We will show that we can
lower bound the generalization error of the best hypothesis in class L∗ := L(h∗) in terms of that of the
empirical minimizer of Lγ , ĥγ := argminh∈H L̂γ(h).
Theorem 11 Let M = supb∈B b(1) and let H be a hypothesis set with pseudo-dimension d = Pdim(H).
Then for any δ > 0 and a fixed value of γ > 0, with probability at least 1− δ over the choice of a sample S
of size m, the following inequality holds:
L(ĥγ) ≤ L∗ + 2γ + 2
γ
Rm(H) + γM + 2M
√
2d log md
m
+ 2M
√
log 2δ
2m
.
Proof By Theorem 3, with probability at least 1− δ/2, the following holds:
L(ĥγ) ≤ L̂S(ĥγ) + 2Rm(H) + 2M
√
2d log md
m
+M
√
log 2δ
2m
. (15)
Furthermore, applying Lemma 9 with the empirical distribution induced by the sample, we can bound L̂S(ĥγ)
by L̂γ(ĥγ) + γM . The first term of the previous expression is less than L̂γ(h∗γ) by definition of ĥγ . Finally,
the same analysis as the one used in the proof of Theorem 10 shows that with probability 1− δ/2,
L̂γ(h∗γ) ≤ Lγ(h∗γ) +
2
γ
Rm(H) +M
√
log 2δ
2m
.
Again, by definition of h∗γ and using the fact that L is an upper bound on Lγ , we can write Lγ(h∗γ) ≤
Lγ(h∗) ≤ L(h∗). Thus,
L̂S(ĥγ) ≤ L(h∗) + 1
γ
Rm(H) +M
√
log 2δ
2m
+ γM.
Combining this with (15) and applying the union bound yields the result.
This bound can be extended to hold uniformly over all γ at the price of a term in O
(√log log2 1γ√
m
)
. Thus, for
appropriate choices of γ and m (for instance γ  1/m1/4) it would guarantee the convergence of L(ĥγ) to
L∗, a stronger form of consistency.
These results are reminiscent of the standard margin bounds with γ playing the role of a margin. The
situation here is however somewhat different. Our learning bounds suggest, for a fixed γ ∈ (0, 1], to seek
a hypothesis h minimizing the empirical loss L̂γ(h) while controlling a complexity term upper bounding
Rm(H), which in the case of a family of linear hypotheses could be ‖h‖2K for some PSD kernelK. Since the
bound can hold uniformly for all γ, we can use it to select γ out of a finite set of possible grid search values.
Alternatively, γ can be set via cross-validation.
4. Algorithms
In this section we present algorithms for solving the optimization problem for selecting the reserve price. We
start with the no-feature case and then treat the general case.
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Figure 4: (a) Prototypical v-function. (b) Illustration of the fact that the definition of Vi(r,bi) does not
change on an interval [nk, nk+1].
4.1 No feature case
We present a general algorithm to optimize sums of functions similar to Lγ or L in the one-dimensional case.
Definition 12 We will say that function V : R× B → R is a v-function if it admits the following form:
V (r,b) = −a(1)1r≤b(2) − a(2)r1b(2)<r≤b(1) + (a(3)r − a(4))1b(1)<r<(1+η)b(1) ,
with a(1) > 0 and η > 0 constants and a(1), a(2), a(3), a(4) defined by a(1) = ηa(3)b(2), a(2) = ηa(3), and
a(4) = a(3)(1 + η)b(1).
Figure 4(a) illustrates this family of loss functions. A v-function is a generalization of Lγ and L. Indeed, any
v-function V satisfies V (r,b) ≤ 0 and attains its minimum at b(1). Finally, as can be seen straightforwardly
from Figure 3, Lγ is a v-function for any γ ≥ 0. We consider the following general problem of minimizing
a sum of v-functions:
min
r≥0
F (r) :=
m∑
i=1
Vi(r,bi). (16)
Observe that this is not a trivial problem since, for any fixed bi, Vi(·,bi) is non-convex and that, in general, a
sum of m such functions may admit many local minima. The following proposition shows that the minimum
is attained at one of the highest bids, which matches the intuition.
Proposition 13 Problem (16) admits a solution r∗ that satisfies r∗ = b(1)i for some i ∈ [1,m].
In order to proof this proposition a pair of lemmas are required.
Definition 14 For any r ∈ R, define the following subset of R:
Ω(r) = {|r < b(1)i ↔ r +  ≤ b(1)i ∀i}
We will drop the dependency on r when this value is understood from context.
Lemma 15 Let r 6= b(1)i for all i. If  > 0 is such that [−, ] ⊂ Ω(r) then F (r + ) < F (r) or F (r − ) ≤
F (r).
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Figure 5: Illustration of the region Ω(r). The functions Vi are monotonic and concave when restricted to this
region.
Proof Let vi = Vi(r,bi) and vi() = Vi(r + ,bi). For  ∈ Ω(r) define the sets D() = {i | vi() ≤ vi}
and I() = {i | vi() > vi}. If∑
i∈D()
vi +
∑
i∈I()
vi >
∑
i∈D()
vi() +
∑
i∈I()
vi(),
then, by definition, we have F (r) > F (r+ ) and the result is proven. If this inequality is not satisfied, then,
by grouping indices in D() and I() we must have∑
i∈D()
vi − vi() ≤
∑
i∈I()
vi()− vi (17)
Notice that vi() ≤ vi if and only if vi(−) ≥ vi. Indeed, the function Vi(r + η,bi) is monotone for
η ∈ [−, ] as long as [−, ] ⊂ Ω which is true by the choice of . This fact can easily be seen in Figure 5.
Hence D() = I(−), similarly I() = D(−) Furthermore, because Vi(r + η,bi) is also concave for
η ∈ [−, ]. We must have
1
2
(vi(−) + vi()) ≤ vi. (18)
Using (18), the following inequalities are easily derived:
vi(−)− vi ≤ vi − vi() for i ∈ D() (19)
vi()− vi ≤ vi − vi(−) for i ∈ I(). (20)
Combining inequalities (19), (17) and (20) we obtain∑
i∈D()
vi(−)− vi ≤
∑
i∈I()
vi − vi(−)
⇒
∑
i∈I(−)
vi(−)− vi ≤
∑
i∈D(−)
vi − vi(−).
By rearranging back the terms in the inequality we can easily see that F (r − ) ≤ F (r).
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Lemma 16 Under the conditions of Lemma 15, if F (r+ ) ≤ F (r) then F (r+ λ) ≤ F (r) for every λ that
satisfies λ ∈ Ω if and only if  ∈ Ω.
Proof The proof follows the same ideas as those used in the previous lemma. By assumption, we can write∑
D()
vi − vi() ≥
∑
i∈I()
vi()− vi. (21)
It is also clear that I() = I(λ) andD() = D(λ). Furthermore, the same concavity argument of Lemma 15
also yields:
vi() ≥ λ− 1
λ
vi +
1
λ
vi(λ),
which can be rewritten as
1
λ
(vi − vi(λ)) ≥ vi − vi(). (22)
Applying inequality (22) in (21) we obtain
1
λ
∑
D(λ)
vi − vi(λ) ≥ 1
λ
∑
I(λ)
vi(λ)− vi.
Since λ > 0, we can multiply the inequality by λ to derive an inequality similar to (21) which implies that
F (r + λ) ≤ F (r).
Proof (Of Proposition 13) Let r 6= b(1)i for every i. By Lemma 15, we can choose  6= 0 small enough with
F (r + ) ≤ F (r). Furthermore if λ = mini |b
(1)
i −r|
|| then λ satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 16. Hence,
F (r) ≥ F (r + λ) = F (bi∗), where i∗ is the minimizer of |b
(1)
i −r|
|| .
Problem (16) can thus be reduced to examining the value of the function for the m arguments b(1)i ,
i ∈ [1,m]. This yields a straightforward method for solving the optimization which consists of computing
F (b
(1)
i ) for all i and taking the minimum. But, since the computation of each F (b
(1)
i ) takesO(m), the overall
computational cost is in O(m2), which can be prohibitive for even moderately large values of m.
Instead, we present a combinatorial algorithm to solve the optimization problem (16) in O(m logm). Let
N = ⋃i{b(1)i , b(2)i , (1 + η)b(1)i } denote the set of all boundary points associated with the functions V (·,bi).
The algorithm proceeds as follows: first, sort the setN to obtain the ordered sequence (n1, . . . , n3m), which
can be achieved in O(m logm) using a comparison-based sorting algorithm. Next, evaluate F (n1) and
compute F (nk+1) from F (nk) for all k.
The main idea of the algorithm is the following: since the definition of V (·, bi) can only change at
boundary points (see also Figure 4(b)), computing F (nk+1) from F (nk) can be achieved in constant time.
Indeed, since between nk and nk+1 there are only two boundary points, we can compute V (nk+1,bi) from
V (nk,bi) by calculating V for only two values of bi, which can be done in constant time. We now give a
more detailed description and proof of correctness for the algorithm.
Proposition 17 There exists an algorithm to solve optimization problem (16) in O(m logm).
Proof The pseudo-code for the desired algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1. Where a(1)i , ..., a
(4)
i denote
the parameters defining the functions Vi(r,bi).
We will prove that after running Algorithm 1 we can compute F (nj) in constant time using:
F (nj) = c
(1)
j + c
(2)
j nj + c
(3)
j nj + c
(4)
j . (23)
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Algorithm 1 Sorting
N := ⋃mi=1{b(1)i , b(2)i , (1 + η)b(1)i };
(n1, ..., n3m) = Sort(N );
Set ci := (c
(1)
i , c
(2)
i , c
(3)
i , c
(4)
i ) = 0 for i = 1, ..., 3m;
Set c(1)1 = −
∑m
i=1 a
(1)
i ;
for j = 2, ..., 3m do
Set cj = cj−1;
if nj−1 = b
(2)
i for some i then
c
(1)
j = c
(1)
j + a
(1)
i ;
c
(2)
j = c
(2)
j − a(2)i ;
else if nj−1 = b
(1)
i for some i then
c
(2)
j = c
(2)
j + a
(2)
i ;
c
(3)
j = c
(3)
j + a
(3)
i ;
c
(4)
j = c
(4)
j − a(4)i ;
else
c
(3)
j = c
(3)
j − a(3)i ;
c
(4)
j = c
(4)
j + a
(4)
i ;
end if
end for
This holds trivially for n1 since by definition n1 ≤ b(2)i for all i and therefore F (n1) = −
∑m
i=1 a
(1)
i . Now,
assume that (23) holds for j, we prove that it must also hold for j+ 1. Suppose nj = b2i for some i (the cases
nj = b
(1)
i and nj = (1 + η)b
(1)
i can be handled in the same way). Then Vi(nj ,bi) = −a(1)i and we can write∑
k 6=i
Vk(nj ,bk) = F (nj)− V (nj ,bi) = (c(1)j + c(2)j nj + c(3)j nj + c(4)j ) + a(1)i .
Thus, by construction we would have:
c
(1)
j+1 + c
(2)
j+1nj+1 + c
(3)
j+1nj+1 + c
(4)
j+1 = c
(1)
j + a
(1)
i + (c
(2)
j − a(2)i )nj+1 + c(3)j nj+1 + c(4)j
= (c
(1)
j + c
(2)
j nj+1 + c
(3)
j nj+1 + c
(4)
j ) + a
(1)
i − a(2)i nj+1
=
∑
k 6=i
Vk(nj+1,bk)− a(2)i nj+1,
where the last equality holds since the definition of Vk(r,bk) does not change for r ∈ [nj , nj+1] and k 6= i.
Finally, since nj was a boundary point, the definition of Vi(r,bi) must change from−a(1)i to−a(2)i r, thus the
last equation is indeed equal to F (nj+1). A similar argument can be given if nj = b
(1)
i or nj = (1 + η)b
(1)
i .
Let us analyze the complexity of the algorithm: sorting the set N can be performed in O(m logm) and
each iteration takes only constant time. Thus the evaluation of all points can be done in linear time. Having
found all values, the minimum can also be obtained in linear time. Thus, the overall time complexity of the
algorithm is O(m logm).
The algorithm just proposed can be straightforwardly extended to solve the minimization of F over a
set of r-values bounded by Λ, that is {r : 0 ≤ r ≤ Λ}. Indeed, we then only need to compute F (b(1)i ) for
i ∈ [1,m] such that b(1)i < Λ and of course also F (Λ), thus the computational complexity in that regularized
case remains O(m logm).
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4.2 General case
We first consider the case of a hypothesis set H of linear functions x 7→ w ·x with bounded norm, ‖w‖ ≤ Λ,
for some Λ ≥ 0. This can be immediately generalized to the case where a positive definite kernel is used.
The results of Theorem 10 suggest seeking, for a fixed γ ≥ 0, the vector w solution of the following
optimization problem: min‖w‖≤Λ
∑m
i=1 Lγ(w · xi,bi). Replacing the original loss L with Lγ helped us
remove the discontinuity of the loss. But, we still face an optimization problem based on a sum of non-
convex functions. This problem can be formulated as a DC-programming (difference of convex functions
programming) problem. Indeed, Lγ can be decomposed as follows for all (r,b) ∈ X × B: Lγ(r,b) =
u(r,b)− v(r,b), with the convex functions u and v defined by
u(r,b) = −r1r<b(1) + r−(1+γ)b
(1)
γ 1r≥b(1)
v(r,b) = (−r + b(2))1r<b(2) + r−(1+γ)b
(1)
γ 1r>(1+γ)b(1) .
Using the decomposition Lγ = u− v, our optimization problem can be formulated as follows:
min
w∈RN
U(w)− V (w) subject to ‖w‖ ≤ Λ, (24)
where U(w) =
∑m
i=1 u(w · xi,bi) and V (w) =
∑m
i=1 v(w · xi,bi), which shows that it can be formulated
as a DC-programming problem. The global minimum of the optimization problem (24) can be found using a
cutting plane method Horst and Thoai (1999), but that method only converges in the limit and does not admit
known algorithmic convergence guarantees.3 There exists also a branch-and-bound algorithm with exponen-
tial convergence for DC-programming Horst and Thoai (1999) for finding the global minimum. Nevertheless,
in Tao and An (1997), it is pointed out that this type of combinatorial algorithms fail to solve real-world DC-
programs in high dimensions. In fact, our implementation of this algorithm shows that the convergence of
the algorithm in practice is extremely slow for even moderately high-dimensional problems. Another attrac-
tive solution for finding the global solution of a DC-programming problem over a polyhedral convex set is
the combinatorial solution of Hoang Tuy Tuy (1964). However, casting our problem as an instance of that
problem requires explicitly specifying the slope and offsets for the piecewise linear function corresponding
to a sum of Lγ losses, which admits an exponential cost in time and space.
An alternative consists of using the DC algorithm, a primal-dual sub-differential method of Dinh Tao and
Hoai An Tao and An (1998), (see also Tao and An (1997) for a good survey). This algorithm is applicable
when u and v are proper lower semi-continuous convex functions as in our case. When v is differentiable, the
DC algorithm coincides with the CCCP algorithm of Yuille and Rangarajan Yuille and Rangarajan (2003),
which has been used in several contexts in machine learning and analyzed by Sriperumbudur and Lanckriet
(2012).
The general proof of convergence of the DC algorithm was given by Tao and An (1998). In some special
cases, the DC algorithm can be used to find the global minimum of the problem as in the trust region problem
Tao and An (1998), but, in general, the DC algorithm or its special case CCCP are only guaranteed to converge
to a critical point Tao and An (1998); Sriperumbudur and Lanckriet (2012). Nevertheless, the number of
iterations of the DC algorithm is relatively small. Its convergence has been shown to be in fact linear for
DC-programming problems such as ours Yen et al. (2012). The algorithm we are proposing goes one step
further than that of Tao and An (1998): we use DCA to find a local minimum but then restart our algorithm
with a new seed that is guaranteed to reduce the objective function. Unfortunately, we are not in the same
regime as in the trust region problem of Dinh Tao and Hoai An Tao and An (1998) where the number of local
minima is linear in the size of the input. Indeed, here the number of local minima can be exponential in the
number of dimensions of the feature space and it is not clear to us how the combinatorial structure of the
problem could help us rule out some local minima faster and make the optimization more tractable.
3. Some claims of Horst and Thoai (1999), e.g., Proposition 4.4 used in support of the cutting plane algorithm, are incorrect Tuy
(2002).
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DC Algorithm
w← w0 . initialization
for t ≥ 1 do
wt ← DCA(w) . DCA algorithm
w← OPTIMIZE(objective,fixed direction wt/‖wt‖)
end for
Figure 6: Pseudocode of our DC-programming algorithm.
In the following, we describe more in detail the solution we propose for solving the DC-programming
problem (24). The functions v and V are not differentiable in our context but they admit a sub-gradient
at all points. We will denote by δV (w) an arbitrary element of the sub-gradient ∂V (w), which coincides
with ∇V (w) at points w where V is differentiable. The DC algorithm then coincides with CCCP, modulo
the replacement of the gradient of V by δV (w). It consists of starting with a weight vector w0 ≤ Λ and
of iteratively solving a sequence of convex optimization problems obtained by replacing V with its linear
approximation giving wt as a function of wt−1, for t = 1, . . . , T : wt ∈ argmin‖w‖≤Λ U(w)− δV (wt−1) ·
w. This problem can be rewritten in our context as the following:
min
‖w‖≤Λ,s
m∑
i=1
si − δV (wt−1) ·w (25)
subject to (si≥−w · xi)∧
[
si≥ 1
γ
(
w · xi−(1 + γ)b(1)i
)]
.
The problem is equivalent to a QP (quadratic-programming) problem since the quadratic constraint can be
replaced by a term of the form λ‖w‖2 in the objective and thus can be tackled using any standard QP solver.
We propose an algorithm that iterates along different local minima, but with the guarantee of reducing the
function at every change of local minimum. The algorithm is simple and is based on the observation that the
function Lγ is positive homogeneous. Indeed, for any η > 0 and (r,b),
Lγ(ηr, ηb) = −ηb(2)1ηr<ηb(2) − ηr1ηb(2)≤ηr≤ηb(1) +
ηr − (1 + γ)ηb(1)
γ
1ηb(1)<ηr<η(1+γ)b(1)
= ηLγ(r,b).
Minimizing the objective function of (24) in a fixed direction u, ‖u‖ = 1, can be reformulated as follows:
min0≤η≤Λ
∑m
i=1 Lγ(ηu · xi,bi). Since for u · xi ≤ 0 the function η 7→ Lγ(ηu · xi,bi) is constant equal to
−b(2)i the problem is equivalent to solving
min
0≤η≤Λ
∑
u·xi>0
Lγ(ηu · xi,bi).
Furthermore, since Lγ is positive homogeneous, for all i ∈ [1,m] with u · xi > 0, Lγ(ηu · xi,bi) =
(u · xi)Lγ(η,bi/(u · xi)). But η 7→ (u · xi)Lγ(η,bi/(u · xi)) is a v-function and thus the problem can
efficiently optimized using the combinatorial algorithm for the no-feature case (Section 4.1). This leads to the
optimization algorithm described in Figure 6. The last step of each iteration of our algorithm can be viewed
as a line search and this is in fact the step that reduces the objective function the most in practice. This is
because we are then precisely minimizing the objective function even though this is for some fixed direction.
Since in general this line search does not find a local minimum (we are likely to decrease the objective value
in other directions that are not the one in which the line search was performed) running DCA helps us find a
better direction for the next iteration of the line search.
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5. Experiments
In this section we report the results of several experiments done on synthetic, as well as realistic data demon-
strating the benefits of our algorithm. Since the use of features for reserve price optimization is a completely
novel idea, we are not aware of any baseline for comparison with our algorithm. Therefore, its performance
is measured against three natural strategies that we now describe.
As mentioned before, a standard solution for solving this problem would be the use of a convex surrogate
loss. For that reason, we compare against the solution of the regularized minimization of the convex surrogate
loss Lα shown in Figure 1(b) parametrized by α ∈ [0, 1] and defined by
Lα(r,b)=
{−r if r < b(1) + α(b(2) − b(1))(
(1−α)b(1)+αb(2)
α(b(1)−b(2))
)
(r − b(1)) otherwise.
A second alternative consists of using ridge regression to estimate the first bid and use its prediction as the
reserve price. A third algorithm consists of minimizing the loss while ignoring the feature vectors xi, i.e.,
solving the problem minr≤Λ
∑n
i=1 L(r,bi). It is worth mentioning that this third approach is very similar to
what advertisement exchanges currently use to suggest reserve prices to publishers. By using the empirical
version of Equation (1), we see this algorithm is equivalent to finding the empirical distribution of bids and
optimizing the expected revenue with respect to this empirical distribution as in (Ostrovsky and Schwarz,
2011) and (Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2013).
5.1 Artificial data sets
We generated 4 different synthetic data sets with different correlation levels between features and bids. For
all our experiments, the feature vectors x ∈ R21 were generated in the following way: x˜ ∈ R20 was sampled
from a standard Gaussian distribution and x = (x˜, 1) was created by adding an offset feature. We now
describe the bid generating process for each of the experiments as a function of the feature vector x. For
our first three experiments, shown in Figure 7(a)-(c), the highest bid and second highest bid were set to
max
(∣∣∣∑21i=1 xi∣∣∣+1, ∣∣∣∑21i=1 xi2 +2∣∣∣)
+
and min
(∣∣∣∑21i=1 xi∣∣∣+1, ∣∣∣∑21i=1 xi2 +2∣∣∣)
+
respectively. Where
i is a Gaussian random variable with mean 0. The standard deviation of the Gaussian noise was varied over
the set {0, 0.25, 0.5}.
For our last artificial experiment we used a generative model supported on previous empirical observations
(Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2011; Lahaie and Pennock, 2007): bids were generated by sampling two values
from a lognormal distribution with means x ·w and x·w2 and standard deviation 0.5. Where w was random
vector sampled from a standard Gaussian distribution.
For all our experiments, the parameters Λ, γ and α were tuned by using a validation set of the same num-
ber of examples as the training set. The test set consisted of 5,000 examples drawn from the same distribution
as the training set. Each experiment was repeated 10 times and the mean revenue of each algorithm is shown
in Figure 7. The plots are normalized in such a way that the revenue obtained by setting no reserve price is
equal to 0 and the maximum possible revenue (which can be obtained by setting the reserve price equal to the
highest bid) is equal to 1. The performance of the ridge regression algorithm is not included in Figure 7(d) as
it was too inferior to be comparable with the performance of the other algorithms.
By inspecting the results in Figure 7(a) we see that even in the simplest, noiseless scenario our algorithm
outperforms all other techniques. It is also worth noticing that the use of ridge regression is actually worse
than using no features for training. This fact is easily understood by noticing that the square loss used in
regression is symmetric. Therefore, we can expect several reserve prices to be above the highest bid, which
are equivalent to zero revenue auctions. Another notable feature is that as the noise level increases, the perfor-
mance of feature-based algorithms decreases. This is however true of any machine learning algorithm: if the
features become less relevant to the prediction task, the performance of the algorithm will suffer. However,
for the convex surrogate algorithm something more critical occurs: the performance of this algorithm actually
18
(a)
-0.2
-0.1
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
100 200 400 800 1600
NF CVX DC Reg
(b)
-0.2
-0.1
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
100 200 400 800 1600
NF CVX DC Reg
(c)
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.35
 0.4
100 200 400 800 1600
NF CVX DC Reg
(d)
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
200 300 400 600 800 1000120016002400
DC CVX NF
Figure 7: Plots of expected revenue against sample size for different algorithms: DC algorithm (DC), convex
surrogate (CVX) and ridge regression (Reg). For (a)-(c) bids are generated with different noise
standard deviation (a) 0, (b) 0.25, (c) 0.5. The bids in (d) were generated using a generative model.
decreases as the sample size increases, which shows that in general learning with a convex surrogate is not
possible. This is an empirical verification of the inconsistency result provided in Section 3.1. This lack of
calibration can also seen in Figure 7(d), where in fact the performance of this algorithm approaches the use
of no reserve price.
In order to better understand the reason behind the performance discrepancy between feature-based al-
gorithms, we analyze the reserve prices offered by each algorithm. In Figure 8(a) we see that the convex
surrogate algorithm tends to offer lower reserve prices. This should be intuitively clear as high reserve prices
are over-penalized by the chosen convex surrogate as shown in Figure 2. On the other hand, reserve prices
suggested by the regression algorithm seem to be concentrated and symmetric around their mean, therefore
we can infer that about 50% of the reserve prices offered will be higher than the highest bid thereby yielding
zero revenue.
5.2 Realistic data sets
Due to confidentiality and proprietary reasons, we cannot present empirical results with AdExchange data.
However, we were able to secure an eBay data set consisting of collector sport cards. These cards were sold
using a second price auction with reserve and the full data set can now be found in the following website:
http://cims.nyu.edu/˜munoz/data. Some other sources of auction data sets are accessible (e.g.
http://modelingonlineauctions.com/datasets), but no feature is available in those data sets.
To the best of our knowledge, with exception of the data set used here, there is no publicly available data
set for online auctions including features that could be readily used with our algorithm. The features include
information about the seller such as positive feedback percent, seller rating and seller country; as well infor-
mation about the card such as whether the player is in the sport’s hall of fame. The final dimension of the
feature vectors is 78. The values of these features are both continuous and categorical.
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Figure 8: (a) Distribution of reserve prices for each algorithm. The algorithms were trained on 800 samples
using noisy bids with standard deviation 0.5. (b) Results of the eBay data set.
Since the highest bid is not reported by eBay, our algorithm cannot be used straightforwardly on this data
set. In order to generate highest bids, we calculated the mean price of each object (each card was generally
sold more than once) and set the highest bid to be the maximum between this average and the second highest
bid.
On Figure 8(b) we show the revenue obtained by using our DC algorithm, a convex surrogate and the
algorithm that ignores features. We also show the results obtained by using no reserve price (NR) and highest
possible revenue (HB). From the whole data set 2000 examples were randomly selected for training, valida-
tion and testing. This experiment was repeated 10 times and Figure 8(b) shows the mean revenue of each
algorithm and standard deviations.
6. Conclusion
We presented a comprehensive theoretical and algorithmic analysis of the learning problem of revenue opti-
mization in second-price auctions with reserve. The specific properties of the loss function for this problem
required a new analysis and new learning guarantees. The algorithmic solutions we presented are practically
applicable to revenue optimization problems for this type of auctions in most realistic settings. Our exper-
imental results further demonstrate their effectiveness. Much of the analysis and algorithms presented, in
particular our study of calibration questions, can also be of interest in other learning problems.
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Appendix A. Contraction lemma
The following is a version of Talagrand’s contraction lemma Ledoux and Talagrand (2011). Since our defini-
tion of Rademacher complexity does not use absolute values, we give an explicit proof below.
Lemma 18 Let H be a hypothesis set of functions mapping X to R and Ψ1, . . . ,Ψm, µ-Lipschitz functions
for some µ > 0. Then, for any sample S of m points x1, . . . , xm ∈ X , the following inequality holds
1
m
E
σ
[
sup
h∈H
m∑
i=1
σi(Ψi ◦ h)(xi)
]
≤ µ
m
E
σ
[
sup
h∈H
m∑
i=1
σih(xi)
]
= µ R̂S(H).
Proof The proof is similar to the case where the functions Ψi are all equal. Fix a sample S = (x1, . . . , xm).
Then, we can rewrite the empirical Rademacher complexity as follows:
1
m
E
σ
[
sup
h∈H
m∑
i=1
σi(Ψi ◦ h)(xi)
]
=
1
m
E
σ1,...,σm−1
[
E
σm
[
sup
h∈H
um−1(h) + σm(Ψm ◦ h)(xm)
]]
,
where um−1(h) =
∑m−1
i=1 σi(Ψi ◦ h)(xi). Assume that the suprema can be attained and let h1, h2 ∈ H be
the hypotheses satisfying
um−1(h1) + Ψm(h1(xm)) = sup
h∈H
um−1(h) + Ψm(h(xm))
um−1(h2)−Ψm(h2(xm)) = sup
h∈H
um−1(h)−Ψm(h(xm)).
When the suprema are not reached, a similar argument to what follows can be given by considering instead
hypotheses that are -close to the suprema for any  > 0.
By definition of expectation, since σm uniform distributed over {−1,+1}, we can write
E
σm
[
sup
h∈H
um−1(h) + σm(Ψm ◦ h)(xm)
]
=
1
2
sup
h∈H
um−1(h) + (Ψm ◦ h)(xm) + 1
2
sup
h∈H
um−1(h)− (Ψm ◦ h)(xm)
=
1
2
[um−1(h1) + (Ψm ◦ h1)(xm)] + 1
2
[um−1(h2)− (Ψm ◦ h2)(xm)].
Let s = sgn(h1(xm)− h2(xm)). Then, the previous equality implies
E
σm
[
sup
h∈H
um−1(h) + σm(Ψm ◦ h)(xm)
]
=
1
2
[um−1(h1) + um−1(h2) + sµ(h1(xm)− h2(xm))]
=
1
2
[um−1(h1) + sµh1(xm)] +
1
2
[um−1(h2)− sµh2(xm)]
≤ 1
2
sup
h∈H
[um−1(h) + sµh(xm)] +
1
2
sup
h∈H
[um−1(h)− sµh(xm)]
= E
σm
[
sup
h∈H
um−1(h) + σmµh(xm)
]
,
where we used the µ−Lipschitzness of Ψm in the first equality and the definition of expectation over σm for
the last equality. Proceeding in the same way for all other σi’s (i 6= m) proves the lemma.
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